The recent decline in the Federal Reserve's check volumes has received a lot of attention. Although switching to electronic payments methods and electronic checkprocessing has been credited for much of that decline, some of it could be caused by changes following bank mergers involving Federal Reserve customer banks. This paper evaluates the effect of bank mergers on Federal Reserve check-processing volumes.
I. Introduction
Prior to the 1990s, U.S. banking markets were protected from entry by out-ofstate depository institutions. The deregulation of unit banking and branch banking took place over several years and ended with passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act in 1994. The number of mergers, already high in the 1980s, increased substantially in the 1990s. Between 1980 and 2003, the number of banking organizations decreased by half. The mergers raised concentration levels in banking markets. During that time, the share of deposits held by the ten largest commercial banking organizations grew from 19 percent to 41 percent (Pilloff 2004) .
Mergers have caused banks to change their internal payments processing. As
Roger Ferguson, the Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System noted in his speech, "Financial consolidation is affecting the market structures for payment and securities settlement as well as banks' internal systems and procedures for payment and back-office activities." (Ferguson 2002 ). One of the major changes in bank back-office payment processing is in the way banks handle interbank checks.
When Bank A merges with Bank B, interbank checks that were previously drawn on Bank A and deposited at B become "on-us" and are processed inside the newly formed institution. Thus, if the interbank checks were previously sent to a Reserve Bank for processing, the volume of checks received by Reserve Banks will decline following that bank merger, all else being constant. On the other hand, a small depository institution that previously used a correspondent bank to process its checks might start sending its checks to a Reserve Bank for processing if the correspondent bank merged with another institution and raised its check processing fees.
The number of checks processed by Reserve Banks has declined in the last few years. Similar trends have been observed by commercial banks. Although statistics on the volume of checks collected in the United States are scarce, the number of checks seems to be falling, caused in part by a growing number of electronic payments gradually eroding the large number of paper checks still written. However, at least some of the decline in checks may be caused by mergers between commercial banks.
Although the literature on effects of bank mergers is vast, most of it focuses on the impact of mergers on market competition (Simons and Stavins 1998 , Prager and Hannan 1998 , Amel and Liang 1997 , Calem and Nakamura 1995 ; on efficiency (Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan 1999 , Berger and Humphrey 1997 , Rhoades 1998 , and DeYoung, Hasan, and Kirchoff 1998 ; on market entry (Berger, Bonime, Goldberg, and White 2000) ; and on credit availability (Whalen 2001, and Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan 1999) . To our knowledge, there are no papers on the effect of bank mergers on the volume of checks processed.
A depositing bank has several ways to collect funds: It can present checks directly to the paying institution, use a correspondent bank or a clearinghouse, or send its checks to a Reserve Bank for collection. Because direct presentment is fairly costly to banks, only large banks find it cost effective to present checks directly. 1 The remaining banks use a correspondent bank, a clearinghouse, or a Reserve Bank.
Given the size breakdown of banks, the majority of mergers take place between two small banks. All else being constant, small banks present and receive fewer checks than large banks, and they exchange fewer checks among themselves than do large banks. A merger between two small banks would therefore create relatively few new, on-us checks and is thus unlikely to have a significant impact on the volume of checks processed by the Reserve Banks.
At the other extreme, the largest depository institutions may have substantial volumes of checks exchanged among themselves. These checks do become on-us when the banks merge. In some of those cases, however, the banks already exchanged checks directly prior to the merger. Such a merger would not alter the Federal Reserve's processing volumes. In cases where the banks did not exchange checks directly before 
Data
We used quarterly observations on individual depository institutions in the To control for national and regional economic conditions, the following exogenous variables were used: real GDP growth, employment, unemployment rates, population, and real per capita income. To approximate the value of check float, the data contain quarterly observations on the federal funds effective rate.
Institutions participating in mergers were identified based on information from Exits and entries of merging institutions are flagged based on merger information from NIC, recording the date of the merger and the identities of the target and the acquirer. An event is defined as an exit if a bank participates in a merger in the following quarter, and the current date is the institution's last date appearing in the data. Similarly, an event is defined as an entry if an institution participates in a merger in the current quarter, and the current quarter is its first date in the data. The endpoints of the data series-1996:Q2 and 2002:Q3-are excluded, since the start and end dates in those quarters cannot be reliably determined.
Estimating Merger Effects
Inflows to and outflows from the customer pool can be measured either in terms of number of institutions or in terms of volume gain or loss. Volume loss is measured as the exiting bank's last recorded volume. Volume gain is calculated differently. If Bank A merges with Bank B, and Bank A was a Federal Reserve customer but Bank B was not, we want to measure the volume gain due to Bank B's entry. We calculate it as the first recorded volume of the merged entity minus Bank A's volume in the last period before the merger. We assume that Bank A will continue processing the same number of checks in the period of the merger because data on its actual check volume during the quarter of the merger cannot be separated from the combined volume of the newly formed institution. 
Regression analysis
We use data on banks that were Reserve Bank customers prior to the merger as well as after the merger to assess check volume decline due to the resulting consolidation of operations. When banks merge, they typically process more on-us checks and thus send fewer checks to outside processors, including Reserve Banks.
Restricting our data to mergers among existing Reserve Bank customers enables us to use regression analysis.
In order to estimate the effect of on-us checks on the Federal Reserve checkprocessing volume, it is necessary to compare the pre-merger volume of each merger participant with the post-merger volume of the combined institution. Prior to the merger, the dependent variable is the sum of the individual volumes, while after the merger, it is the actual volume of the newly formed entity. For every pair of merging institutions, individual volumes are summed up one quarter before the merger and regressed on a vector of quarterly time-dummies, with dummy variables indicating the quarter of the merger and four subsequent quarters. Banks not participating in a merger provide a control group. Of the 8,000 Federal Reserve customers in a quarterly crosssection, typically about 5 percent participate in a merger or acquisition. The results are described in the next section.
Specifications
We estimated several regression specifications. To test whether banks participating in mergers tend to have higher check volumes, even when controlling for their assets and deposits, we included a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank had ever merged. The coefficient on that dummy variable was positive and significant in all specifications, indicating that there are systematic differences between merging and non-merging banks that are not accounted for by other variables.
In some specifications, we included bank assets and deposits to control for financial institution size, either as continuous variables or as sets of dummy variables indicating size. However, fixed-effects regressions produced a better fit. Therefore, our preferred specification is a fixed-effects regression with individual bank effects. We estimated level regressions and rate-of-change regressions. In level regressions, the volume of checks was regressed on a set of dummy variables indicating whether the bank participated in a merger in the current quarter or in any of the previous four quarters.
When five quarterly merger-dummy variables were included, the results showed a statistically significant drop in check volume during each of the five quarters. The drop was larger in the first three quarters and smaller in the two quarters that followed.
The results of this regression are shown in Table 1 . On average, the number of checks dropped by 600 thousand to 700 thousand in each of the first three post-merger quarters.
The estimated cumulative average decline in the first five post-merger quarters was 2.6 million.
In a rate-of-change specification, the dependent variable was a quarterly percentage change in check volume. The results (Table 2) indicate an approximately 15-percent drop in check volume in the quarter of the merger relative to the previous quarter, with substantially smaller decreases in each of the four following quarters.
When we limited the sample to banks that merged at any time, the first-quarter drop in checks was smaller-9 percent-but the cumulative drop in the five quarters was approximately 18 percent, compared with over 21 percent in the total sample regression.
In all the specifications, most of the decline in check volume took place in the quarter of the merger or in the following quarter. However, merging banks' check volumes seem to be generally higher than those of banks that do not participate in mergers, even after controlling for bank size and location. We analyze two types of effects: changes in check volume following mergers between Reserve Bank customer banks and non-customer banks and changes following mergers between Reserve Bank customers. We find that mergers of the first type resulted in volume gains early in the sample, but generated volume losses during the last two years. However, mergers between two or more Reserve Bank customers have resulted in volume losses, especially during the first quarter after the merger. On average, the estimated cumulative loss of volume during the first five post-merger quarters was 2.6 million checks. While the overall number of checks in the United States has declined during the past few years, the Federal Reserve has lost additional checkprocessing volume because of bank mergers. Note: t-statistics are given in parentheses.
Conclusion
* Both LHS and RHS variables are defined here as percent change from the previous quarter, with the exception of state unemployment rates and the federal funds rate, for which first differences are used. We calculate percent change as the difference of the two values divided by their mean. 
